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Wer u¨ber dem Unmo¨glichen das Mo¨gliche versa¨umt, der ist ein Tor.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
Tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to gain
some other advantage, is usually seen as being against the spirit of sports. It is
especially problematic when the two teams playing a match are both interested in a
draw, since it may lead to tacit collusion. It is revealed that this situation occurred
in a particular football match. We demonstrate that the root of the problem is the
incentive incompatible design of recent UEFA qualification tournaments, so it might
happen in the future until decision-makers do not apply a strategy-proof mechanism.
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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that any tournament design should provide contestants with the
appropriate incentives to perform (Szymanski, 2003). However, sports rules sometimes
* e-mail: laszlo.csato@uni-corvinus.hu
1 “He who neglects the possible in quest of the impossible is a fool.” (Source: Carl von Clausewitz:
On War, Book 8, Chapter 9 – Plan of War when the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object, trans-
lated by Colonel James John Graham, London, N. Tru¨bner, 1873. http://clausewitz.com/readings/
OnWar1873/TOC.htm)
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seem to inspire tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game. For
instance, if a team is already eliminated from the playoff, it can be profitable to decrease
the effort in order to secure a better position in the draft for the next season (Fornwagner,
2018; Lenten et al., 2018). In other cases, strategic manipulation may result in playing
against a preferred competitor in the next stage of a tournament (Pauly, 2014; Vong,
2017).
Here we do not deal with this probabilistic aspect of manipulation, it is assumed that a
team deliberately loses only if it cannot be worse off by tanking, in other words, teams are
extremely risk-averse in the choice of their strategy. Examples include a famous football2
match played by Barbados and Grenada in the 1994 Caribbean Cup qualification (Kendall
and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.4), qualifications for FIFA Worlds Cups (Dagaev and Sonin,
2013; Csato´, 2017), UEFA club competitions (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017; Csato´, 2018c,e),
UEFA European Championships (Csato´, 2018a,d), or tournaments with subsequent group
stages (Csato´, 2018b).
While it is usually unacceptable when a team can be strictly better off by losing, there
are some potential arguments which decrease the importance of incentive incompatibility
in practice. First, the probability that such a situation occurs is often (very) low. Second,
one may think that both teams cannot be interested in losing.
In the following, it will be shown that the second argument is not valid, at least in
a particular tournament format. As a motivation, a real-world football match will be
analysed when playing a draw was the only opportunity to qualify for the two teams
playing against each other. After that, we reveal the causes of the bizarre situation, and
make suggestions to prevent the occurrence of such tacit collusion in the future. This is
our main contribution.
To illustrate the strength of the applied concept, consider the notorious football match
called ’Nichtangriffspakt (or Schande) von Gijo´n’ (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.1).
It was the final game of Group 2 of the 1982 FIFA World Cup, played by West Germany
and Austria. A win by one or two goals for West Germany would result in both teams
qualifying at the expense of Algeria, while all other results would lead to the elimination
of either West Germany or Austria. After ten minutes West Germany scored, and the
remaining 80 minutes was characterized by few serious attempts to attack. However,
playing 1-0 was not a strictly dominant strategy for the teams: West Germany would not
lose anything by kicking an additional goal, and the same holds for Austria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the particular match
where the optimal strategy was a tacit collusion of the two teams. The theoretical
background is described in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
2 The real-world example
The 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualification was a football competition,
organised by the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), to determine the
national teams participating in the 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship final
tournament.3 53 national teams entered the tournament, which was played in two group
stages between September 2015 and April 2016. The qualifying round was followed by
2 Throughout the paper, we use the term football in the European meaning (soccer in the US).
3 This section is mainly based on the Wikipedia page of 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship
qualification.
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the elite round, where 32 teams were drawn into eight groups of four teams each. All
competition matches were played as round-robin mini-tournaments in one of the countries
in the group, with three points awarded for a win, one for a draw and none for a defeat
(UEFA, 2015, Article 13).
Tie-breaking rules in the groups are detailed in UEFA (2015, Article 14) as follows:
If two or more teams are equal on points on completion of a mini-tournament, the following
criteria are applied, in the order given, to determine the rankings:
a. higher number of points obtained in the mini-tournament matches played among
the teams in question;
b. superior goal difference from the mini-tournament matches played among the
teams in question;
c. higher number of goals scored in the mini-tournament matches played among the
teams in question;
d. if, after having applied criteria a. to c., teams still have an equal ranking, criteria
a. to c. are reapplied exclusively to the mini-tournament matches between the
teams in question to determine their final rankings. If this procedure does not lead
to a decision, criteria e. to h. apply;
e. superior goal difference in all mini-tournament matches;
f. higher number of goals scored in all mini-tournament matches;
g. lower disciplinary points total based only on yellow and red cards received in the
mini-tournament matches (red card = 3 points, yellow card = 1 point, expulsion
for two yellow cards in one match = 3 points);
h. drawing of lots.
If two teams which have the same number of points and the same number of goals scored
and conceded play their last mini-tournament match against each other and are still equal
at the end of that match, their final rankings are determined by kicks from the penalty mark,
provided no other team within the group has the same number of points on completion of
the mini-tournament. Should more than two teams have the same number of points, the
criteria listed above apply.
The eight group winners and the seven runners-up qualified for the final tournament.
According to UEFA (2015, Article 15):
To determine the seven best runners-up in the elite round, only the matches of the runners-
up against the winners and third-placed teams of their group are taken into account. The
following criteria are applied in the order given:
a. higher number of points;
b. superior goal difference;
c. higher number of goals scored;
d. lower disciplinary points total based only on yellow and red cards received (red
card = 3 points, yellow card = 1 point, expulsion for two yellow cards in one
match = 3 points);
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Table 1: 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship
qualifying competition – Elite round, Group 6
(a) Match results
Date First team Second team Result
29 March 2016, 18:30 France Greece 1-0
29 March 2016, 18:30 Austria Iceland 0-0
31 March 2016, 18:30 France Iceland 1-0
31 March 2016, 18:30 Greece Austria 0-0
3 April 2016, 15:00 Austria France to be played
3 April 2016, 15:00 Iceland Greece to be played
(b) Standing after two matchdays
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 2 matches.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 2 0 0 2 0 2 6
2 Austria 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
3 Greece 0 1 1 0 1 -1 1
3 Iceland 0 1 1 0 1 -1 1
e. drawing of lots.
A bizarre situation occurred in Group 6 of the elite round, which deserves further
investigation. On the morning of 3 April 2016, each team in the group had one more game
to play. Table 1 shows the known results and the preliminary standing of the group. All
other groups were finished by this date, the worst runner-up being Poland with 1 point, 1
goal for and 2 goals against after discarding its match played against the fourth-placed
team of its group.
We will analyse the possible scenarios by focusing on the match between Greece and
Iceland. Both teams are eliminated if Austria defeats France. If Austria does not win
against France, then the winner would be the runner-up, with 1 point, 0 goals for and 1
goal against in the ranking of second-placed teams, therefore it would be eliminated as the
worst runner-up. Consequently, if Austria draws against France, both Greece and Iceland
are eliminated.
However, Greece or Iceland has an opportunity to qualify if Austria is defeated by
France and they play a draw by scoring at least one goal (in the case of 0-0, Poland is
better among the second-placed teams). Then three teams would have 2 points and group
tie-breaking rule d. provides that Greece and Iceland overtake Austria due to their higher
number of head-to-head goals scored. The runner-up would be determined by criterion g.
of disciplinary points (or by a coin toss according to h., if it is necessary).4 If the result is
1-1, the runner-up has an identical goal record to Poland among the second-placed teams,
so disciplinary points count, but with a draw of at least 2-2, it qualifies ahead of Poland.
4 One may think that these relatively unknown tie-breaking rules are almost never applied in practice.
However, Poland obtained the second place due to a penalty shootout against Ireland in Group 7 of this
competition, and Belgium overtook Spain for the top position with penalties after the end of their match
in Group 8.
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To summarize, the optimal strategy of Greece and Iceland is to play a draw of at least
2-2, independently of the match organised at the same time between Austria and France.
Provided that it is reached – not a big challenge since both teams are interested in this
result –, their objective function is to increase the number of disciplinary points of the
other team, that is, to force the players of the opponent to commit offences. No team
has an ex-ante advantage in disciplinary points because Greece collected one yellow card
against France and two against Austria, while Iceland collected one yellow card against
Austria and two against France. Alternatively, they can collude tacitly to play a draw of
2-2 and wait patiently for the coin toss to determine the team that has a chance to qualify,
depending on the result of the match Austria vs France.
The strictly dominant strategy of Greece and Iceland seems to be against the intention
of administrators. First, it may result in the elimination of a third team. Second, the
rules discourage both teams to kick goals in a particular case, furthermore, players can be
interested in improving other match statistics than the number of goals.
This football match was mentioned in footnote by Kendall and Lenten (2017) without
further discussion. The authors refer to an online forum, available at https://www.reddit.
com/r/soccer/comments/4d5ki3/theres_a_bizarre_situation_in_u17_euro_2016/,
where a user with the nickname Liverpool describes the situation in detail. However, it
contains a flaw since a draw of 2-2 would not be followed by a penalty shootout.
3 Discussion
The root of the problem is the comparison of the second-placed teams – which have not
played any matches against each other – in a badly designed repechage group. Csato´
(2018a) has proved that the application of the same monotonic ranking for each group
including the repechage is insufficient to guarantee the strategy-proofness of the whole
qualification system unless the set of matches considered in the repechage group is chosen
appropriately. In other words, it may happen that one team has an incentive to exert a
lower effort.
According to the example in Section 2, the situation can be even worse since both
teams can be interested in tanking. It makes not much sense to repeat the cumbersome
analysis provided in Csato´ (2018a), in the following we only use the simpler model of
Csato´ (2018d), which still covers recent qualification tournaments in football.
Consider a group-based qualification system 𝒬 where the participating teams are
divided into 𝑘 ≥ 2 round-robin groups such that the number of teams is 𝑛𝑖 in group 𝐺𝑖,
𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘. Under any set of match results R, the top 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0 teams in group 𝐺𝑖 directly
qualify, while the next 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0 teams – whose set is denoted by 𝐵𝑖(R) – are compared in a
so-called repechage group. The remaining 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0 teams are eliminated.
Let 𝐵(R) = ∑︀𝑘𝑖=1𝐵𝑖(R) be the set of teams in the repechage group, where only the
group matches played against the top 𝑐𝑖 teams are considered such that 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑖.
On the basis of match results R, teams are allocated into three distinct sets 𝑇1(R), 𝑇2(R),
and 𝑇3(R), which correspond to the set of teams directly qualified, advanced to play-offs,
and being eliminated, respectively. It means that each team prefers being in 𝑇1(R) to
being in 𝑇2(R) ∪ 𝑇3(R), and they favour being in 𝑇2(R) over being in 𝑇3(R). Allocation
is assumed to be monotonic, that is, no team can achieve a better position in its group
and in the repechage group by having less number of points or goals.
Let 𝒬 be a group-based qualification system with the set of match results R and 𝑥, 𝑦 be
two teams in the same group 𝐺𝑖. The set of match results R′xy is said to be advantageous
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for team 𝑥 with respect to its match(es) against 𝑦, if R and R′xy are identical except that
team 𝑥 has scored more goals against 𝑦 in R′xy.
Definition 3.1. Tacit collusion: Let 𝒬 be a group-based qualification system and R be
a set of match results. Teams 𝑥 and 𝑦 in the same group 𝐺𝑖 can collude tacitly if
∙ one of the following holds for all set of match results R′xy, which are advantageous
for team 𝑥: (1) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇1(R) but 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇2(R′xy) ∪ 𝑇3(R′xy); or (2) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇2(R) but
𝑥 ∈ 𝑇1(R′xy); and
∙ one of the following holds for all set of match results R′yx, which are advantageous
for team 𝑦: (1) 𝑦 ∈ 𝑇1(R) but 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇2(R′yx) ∪ 𝑇3(R′yx); or (2) 𝑦 ∈ 𝑇2(R) but
𝑥 ∈ 𝑇1(R′yx).
In other words, teams 𝑥 and 𝑦 are strictly worse off if they kick a goal against the
other.
The setting above may allow for tacit collusion.
Proposition 3.1. Let 𝒬 be a group-based qualification system. There exists a set of match
results R and teams 𝑥, 𝑦 in the same group 𝐺𝑖 that can collude tacitly under R if:
∙ there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the repechage group, that is,
at least two of the sets 𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇1(R), 𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇2(R), and 𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇3(R) is
non-empty;
∙ a proper subset of group matches played against lower ranked teams in the group
𝐺𝑖 are considered in the repechage group, that is, 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖.
Proof. It is enough to show an example where two teams can collude tacitly, and one can
use the case presented in Section 2. There 𝑎𝑖 = 1, 𝑏𝑖 = 1, 𝑐𝑖 = 3, and 𝑛𝑖 = 4, and this
construction works for 𝑎𝑖 = 0, 𝑏𝑖 = 1, 𝑐𝑖 = 2, and 𝑛𝑖 = 3 by discarding France, as well as
for any other values satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3.1.
The second requirement guarantees that achieving a better position among the teams
of the repechage group is effective with respect to qualification – a crucial part of the
problem in Section 2 was the differentiation of runners-up.
The third condition provides that a team can improve its position in the repechage
group – by influencing its set of matches taken into account – through not kicking more
goals, which is impossible if all matches played against teams ranked lower than the team
relegated to the repechage group from 𝐺𝑖 are discarded or counted.
Remark 3.1. If there is a group-based qualification system allowing for a tacit collusion of
two teams, and tie-breaking rules contain other match statistics than the number of goals
(such as disciplinary points), then these two teams may be interested in improving this
particular match statistics instead of goals.
It is worth noting that UEFA modified tie-breaking rules from the 2017 UEFA European
Under-17 Championship and its qualification (UEFA, 2016), as well as, from the 2017
UEFA European Under-19 Championship and its qualification. To be more specific, they
have added a criterion before drawing of lots both in the groups (h.) and in the repechage
group (e.) as higher position in the coefficient ranking list used for the qualifying round
draw. While it does not give a strict ranking of the teams, it substantially decreases the
probability that some teams should be ranked by a coin toss.
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This change might have worsened the situation presented in Section 2. The coefficient of
Greece was lower than the coefficient of Iceland, therefore for Greece, the only opportunity
to qualify was to play a draw of at least 2-2 and ensure that Iceland has more disciplinary
points (their players get more yellow/red cards during the match).
Finally, the case presented in Section 2 also highlights the importance of tie-breaking
rules, which deserves more attention (Berker, 2014).
4 Conclusions
Austria defeated France, so Greece and Iceland had no chance to qualify. Perhaps their
players were well-informed on the result of the parallel match, and they did not want to
risk the tacit collusion. Nevertheless, it is clear that a serious scandal was barely avoided
during the 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualifying competition. It
seems to be an undeniable warning for the governing bodies of major sports to choose
strategy-proof designs in the future. For example, both FIFA and UEFA are advised to
follow one of the two mechanisms suggested in Csato´ (2018a). Hopefully, the decision of
the FIFA Council on the use of a new formula for the FIFA / Coca-Cola World Ranking on
10 June 2018 (FIFA, 2018) indicates that administrators are increasingly open to criticism
from the scientific community (Lasek et al., 2013, 2016).
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